

Cryptanalysis on HMAC-MD5, MD5-MAC and Sandwich-MAC-MD5

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Hash Function Based MAC

• Message Authentication Codes (MAC) provide the integrity and authenticity.













HMAC

- The most widely used hash-based MAC
 - Requires 2 keys for inner and outer functions
 - Requires 2 hash function calls
 - 3 additional blocks for converting hash into MAC; non-negligible overhead for short messages





Sandwich-MAC

- Several MACs improve HMAC
- Sandwich-MAC [Yasuda ACISP 2007] has advantages on performance.
 - Requires 1 key
 - Requires 1 hash function call
 - 2 additional blocks for converting hash into MAC ; small overhead, suitable for short messages



Motivation

- HMAC and Sandwich-MAC have the same provable security: secure PRF up to $O(2^{n/2})$.
- Need more comparison

- We investigate attacks when a weak hash function (MD5) is instantiated.
- Then, extract features which can be applied in generic.



Our Contributions

- 1. Improve the internal state recovery attack on HMAC-MD5 both in adaptive and non-adaptive settings.
- 2. By using the above, propose a key-recovery attack on Sandwich-MAC-MD5.
 - First key recovery attack on hybrid-type MACs
 - conditional key-dependent distribution technique
- 3. Improve the attack on MD5-MAC_{K^0,K^1,K^2}.
 - Improve the complexity to recover K_1 .
 - Propose the first key recovery attack for K_2 .



Attack Results

Target	Model	Attack goal	Data	Time	Memory	Ref.
HMAC-MD5	Adaptive Adaptive Non-adaptive Non-adaptive	Dist-H/ISR Dist-H/ISR Dist-H/ISR Dist-H/ISR	$2^{97} \\ 2^{89.09} \\ 2^{113} \\ 2^{113-x}$	$2^{97} \\ 2^{89} \\ 2^{113} \\ 2^{113-x}$	2^{89} 2^{89} 2^{66} 2^{66+x}	[32] Ours [32] Ours
MD5-MAC		K_1 -recovery K_1 -recovery (K_1, K_2) -recovery	2^{97} $2^{89.09}$ $2^{89.04}$	2^{97} 2^{89} 2^{89}	2^{89} 2^{89} 2^{89}	[32] Ours Ours
Sandwich- MAC-MD5	Basic Variant B Extended B	Key recovery Key recovery Key recovery	$2^{89.04}$ $2^{89.04}$ $2^{89.04}$	2^{89} 2^{89} 2^{89}	2^{89} 2^{89} 2^{89}	Ours Ours Ours



Improved Single-key Attacks against HMAC-MD5



MD5

• Widely known to be broken but still widely used







dBB-collision

- The compression function h generates a collision with probability 2⁻⁴⁸ for (H_{i-1}, M_{i-1}) and (H_{i-1}', M_{i-1}) when $H_{i-1} \bigoplus H_{i-1}'$ has a special difference called Δ^{MSB} .
- In the dBB-collision, each of the first 16 steps has the differential characteristic with Pr.=2⁻¹.





Previous Attack against HMAC-MD5

- 1. Generate $2^{128} \times 2^{48} = 2^{176}$ pairs by changing M_0 .
 - One pair satisfies the dBB-collision.
 - We have other $2^{176-128}=2^{48}$ collisions. (noise)
- 2. For each 2^{48} collisions, change $M_1 2^{48}$ times.
 - If another collision is found, it is a dBB-collision.



NTT Improving ISR against HMAC-MD5

Previous work: retake all messages \rightarrow Pr = 2⁻⁴⁸.



Ours: Reuse the messages for the first 14 steps so that the characteristic remains satisfied. \rightarrow Pr = 2⁻³⁴.





Key Recovery Attacks against Sandwich-MAC-MD5



Recover the internal state value H₂, similarly with the internal state recovery on HMAC-MD5.





Phase 2: IV Bridge

- From the recovered H_2 , find (M_1, M_1') which generates $\Delta^{\rm MSB}$ at H_3 .
- This can be done by a variant of collision attack called IV Bridge with a complexity of 2¹⁰ [Tao⁺ ePrint].





Phase 3: Collecting dBB-near-collisions

- By querying 2⁴⁸ IV bridges, one tag collision is obtained. To be precise, 2⁴⁷ IV bridges to obtain dBB-near-collisions enough.
- For the dBB-near-collision, 1 bit of internal state is recovered because the characteristic is satisfied.





Key Recovery with Conditional Key Distributions

 Due to the structure of the MD5 compression function, 32 bits of the tag *τ* are computed by (internal state *Q*) ⊞ (a part of secret key *k*)



 By collecting 2³² pairs of such (Q, τ), the secret key k can be recovered.



Conditional Key-dependent Distributions

- Collect pairs in which the 30th bit of τ is 0.
 - 1. If the 30th bit of *k* is 0: two possible carry patterns
 - 2. If the 30th bit of *k* is 1: one possible carry pattern
- Behavior of the addition depends on the key value. This eventually reveals the 30^{th} and 31^{st} bits of k.





Phase 4: Rest of Attacks

- The key for the last step is recovered by using the conditional key distribution.
- Then, all keys are recovered step by step for the last 16 steps.





Key Recovery Attacks against MD5-MAC



Structure of MD5-MAC

- Generate (K_0, K_1, K_2) from the master key K.
 - $-K_0$: used for the initialization.
 - $-K_1$: used for the message processing. The round constant of MD5 is replaced with K_1 .
 - $-K_2$: used for the finalization.





Improvement for MD5-MAC

- The previous work recovered K_1 based on the internal state recovery attack on HMAC-MD5.
- We improve the K_1 recovery similarly to HMAC-MD5.
- We recover K_2 similarly to Sandwich-MAC-MD5.





Discussion: HMAC v.s. Sandwich-MAC







Message processing part is identical.

Finalization is different.

- Sandwich-MAC: A differential characteristic to recover the internal state is reused to recover *K*.
- HMAC: Two good characteristics are needed to recover *K*.



Comparison for Block-cipher Based Hash

Davies-Meyer mode

MMO mode



- In hybrid MACs, the MMO mode is the only choice for the finalization computation to resist side-channel analysis [Okeya ACISP 2006].
- Most of the currently used hash function adopts the Davies-Meyer mode.
- The HMAC construction is the most reasonable!!



Concluding Remarks

Attacks with MD5

- Improved internal state recovery attack on HMAC-MD5 in adaptive and non-adaptive settings.
- Key-recovery attack on Sandwich-MAC-MD5 with conditional key distribution techniques.
- Improve the attack on MD5-MAC.

Comparison with HMAC and Sandwich-MAC

- A certain type of differential characteristic can recover the key for Sandwich-MAC.
- From various viewpoints, HMAC is a solid design.



Thank you for your attention!!